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Abstract
Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-
agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily
focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic
interactions of a large population comprising small and anonymous agents. This
paper presents a formal relation between stochastic processes and the dynamics
of independent learning agents who reason based on the reward signals. Using a
master equation approach, we provide a novel unified framework for characterising
population dynamics via a single partial differential equation (Theorem 1). Through
a case study involving Cross learning agents, we illustrate that Theorem 1 allows us
to identify qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics, to analyse steady states,
and to gain insights into the expected behaviour of a population. In addition, we
present extensive experimental results validating that Theorem 1 holds for a variety
of learning methods and population games.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning (RL) has recently found wide application in real-world multi-agent systems,
such as teams of cooperative robots [4, 37, 42], multi-player online games [17, 29, 57], distributed
sensor networks [15, 19, 39], and traffic control systems [2, 12, 38]. However, in contrast to
traditional single-agent settings, a solid theoretical foundation for RL under multi-agent settings
remains elusive [11, 25, 50]. The fact that multiple autonomous agents interact naturally results in a
highly-dynamic environment. This not only invalidates many convergence guarantees under single-
agent settings, but also makes the learning dynamics much more complex and unpredictable [55].
The latter, usually referred to as non-stationarity, is a key challenge in multi-agent reinforcement
learning (MARL) [24]. In light of the above issues, it is of both theoretical and practical interest
to develop a thorough understanding of the evolutionary learning dynamics in multi-agent systems.
Understanding the dynamics may facilitate important tasks, such as selecting a specific algorithm
for a given problem [8], shedding light on the design of a new algorithm [6, 31], and parameter
tuning [45, 56]. More broadly, the gained insights can engender a more trustworthy AI ecosystem.
In general, prior work on MARL dynamics has primarily focused on 2-player games (e.g., [5, 8,
21, 27, 31, 33, 54]). However, many social, economic and technological scenarios involve a large
number of agents, in which each agent’s payoffs largely rely on the aggregated effect of the other
agents. For example, consider drivers commuting over a highway network; the congestion each driver
experiences depends not only on the route he selects, but also on the number of drivers along the
same route. As another example, the choice of a social networking platform often depends on the
choices of one’s friends. Population games [48] provide a unified framework to model and to analyse
the above situations comprising a great number of agents. However, despite wide application, the
learning dynamics in population games has rarely been investigated.
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This paper aims to formulate the evolutionary dynamics of RL in population games. The large number
of agents in the games calls for an efficient formulation—deriving a dynamical system for each
agent is impractical for a large population. Here, we take a probabilistic viewpoint: we model, at
given time, the critical parameter(s) that characterise an agent’s learning by a random variable, such
that the probability density of a parameter is asymptotically its frequency in the population. Over
time, the collection of random variables forms a stochastic process. We find that understanding this
relation between MARL and stochastic processes is crucial, as it opens new ways of analysing the
evolutionary learning dynamics. In particular, by using a master equation [49], we show how the time
evolution of the probability distribution of the random variable describes the learning dynamics in
population games. As a result, the learning dynamics of a large number of agents can be efficiently
formulated by a single partial differential equation (PDE).
In this paper, we focus our attention to the class of independent learning algorithms in multi-agent
systems. By assuming agents reason based on the reward signals, this line of research effectively
reduces the multi-agent learning problem to a single-agent one [8, 24, 43]. The benefits are twofold:
(i) the vast number of single-agent learning methods can be directly applied to multi-agent settings,
which has been shown to achieve good performance in many multi-agent systems [1, 8, 11, 25, 43].
More importantly, (ii) scalability in the number of other agents in a system is no longer an issue. This
makes it particularly well-suited to population games that involve a great number of agents.
We present an abstract representation of independent learning agents, and establish its relation with
stochastic processes. This leads to a unified framework (Theorem 1) for formulating the evolutionary
dynamics in population games for a variety of independent learning methods. Instantiating Theorem
1 for each learning algorithm leads to a single PDE that characterises the dynamics of a homogeneous
agent population using that algorithm. We illustrate through a case study (on Cross learning [16])
how Theorem 1 helps us identify the qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics, analyse the steady
states, and understand the trend of the expected behaviours of a population. In addition, experiments
with two additional well-known learning methods (Q-learning [58] and infinitesimal gradient ascent
[52]) demonstrate that our approach well-describes the learning dynamics observed in agent-based
simulations for various population games.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we present a brief overview of population games and independent learning.
2.1 Population Games
Recall the examples of highway congestion and social network choice in the introduction. While
these two situations differ, they have the same basic properties in common: (i) the number of agents
is large, (ii) each agent is small, such that any particular one agent’s behaviour has little or negligible
effect on other individual agents, and (iii) each agent is anonymous, in that exchanging the labels of
agents will not create any difference. Population games [48] provide a unified framework to model
situations simultaneously exhibiting the above three properties. In population games, an agent’s
rewards depend only on its own behaviour and the aggregate effect of many other agents’ behaviours,
and is independent of its identity (or label). Formally, we define a population game as follows.
Definition 1 (Population Games) A population game G is a tuple xN ,A,O, Ry. N “ t1, . . . , nu
is a large set of n agents. A “ ta1, . . . , aku is a set of k actions available to each agent. Let
o “ ro1, . . . , oksJ be a population profile (or outcome), where oi denotes the proportion of agents
choosing action ai in the population. O “ to P Rk` :
řk
i“1 oi “ 1u is a set of population profiles.
Rpa,oq : A ˆ O Ñ R is a reward function that determines the reward of an agent by the action
a P A it uses and the population profile o P O.
We consider that agents learn their strategies through the repeated plays of a population game. For
each time step t, all of the agents take an action simultaneously, receive immediate rewards, and
update their strategies. At the next time step t ` 1, agents start over for another play of the game.
Therefore, there is no explicit state transition in each play of the population game, just as in other
normal form games. During repeated plays, what an agent learns is which action to choose in each
play of the game.
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We note that as the number n of agents tends to infinity, one may view population games to be mean
field games [28, 36]. We deliberately use the term population games, since mean field games are
typically associated with optimal agent control; agents do not learn in mean field games other than in
a few notable exceptions [22, 44, 53]. However, these works aim for the final convergence to Nash
equilibriua in the time limit tÑ8, while we emphasise the dynamic process through which agents
adjust their behaviours in response to the strategic agent population.
2.2 Independent Learning and Critical Parameters
Independent learning agents reason based on only the reward signals, and do not perceive or utilise
information about other agents.1 The interaction of an independent learner with an environment is
typically defined as a Markov decision process (MDP). A MDP consists of a set S of states, a set A
of actions, an immediate reward function Rps, aq giving the reward of using action a under state s,
and a transition function T ps1|s, aq that determines the probability of a transition from a state s to
another state s1 after using action a. There is no explicit state transition in a population game; from
an agent’s point of view, it stays in the same state s during the repeated plays. As such, the interaction
with the environment is a single-state (or stateless) MDP. Other agents affects an independent learner
only through the immediate rewards the learner receives.
It is interesting to note that most RL algorithms repeatedly apply an update rule to a set of crit-
ical parameters. Consider Q-learning [58], one of the most well known value-based indepen-
dent learning methods. In a stateless MDP, a Q-learning agent maintains a vector of Q-values
Qptq “ rQ1ptq, . . . , QkptqsJ, each of which Qjptq estimates the expected reward of using a partic-
ular action aj P A.2 At every time step t, the agent updates the Q-values based on the immediate
reward, and then updates its policy (i.e., the probability of taking each action) based on a certain
exploration strategy. For a Q-learning agent, the time evolution of both the Q-values and the policy
can well characterise the agent’s learning dynamics [27, 47, 56, 60]. Therefore, there are two types
of critical parameters in Q-learning: the Q-values and the policy.
Tuyls et al. [56] focus on the policy of a Q-learning agent, and derive two differential equations each
for one agent, which describe the time evolution of the policies in two-player games. More recently,
Hu et al. [27] focus on the Q-values, and show that a differential equation for an agent’s Q-values
can also be derived. In general, a significant number of works [7, 10, 20, 21, 30, 33, 45, 47, 60] have
shown that the learning dynamics of an individual agent can be formulated by a differential equation
of the critical parameters. However, the choice of critical parameters may vary in different learning
methods and out of interest. We refer readers to [8] for a comprehensive survey.
Our work builds upon this line of research. In particular, our main result is that under certain
conditions, the population dynamics of independent learners can be described by a PDE, in which an
ODE characterising the change in the critical parameters of a single agent is incorporated.
3 Modelling the Population Dynamics of Independent Learners
Consider a large set N of n independent learners that play a population game repeatedly. For
any agent i P N , let xpiqptq “ rxpiq1 ptq, . . . , xpiqd ptqsJ P Rd be a vector of d independent critical
parameters at time t, to which the agent repeatedly applies an update rule. The dimension d indicates
the degree of freedom.
To model the population dynamics, one may consider a straightforward system of n differential
equations, each of which characterises the change in the critical parameters of one agent. This
approach may be feasible for a small number of agents. However, the differential equations are
coupled through the immediate rewards because agents affect one another through the rewards. As
the number of agents grows, the corresponding system of n coupled differential equations becomes
intractable.
Alternatively, one can take a probabilistic point of view. At time t, consider an arbitrary agent that
is randomly drawn from the agent population. The critical parameters of this agent can then be
1In many practical applications, it is not reasonable to assume the observability of other agents; most agents
rely on sensory information and action recognition that is often far from trivial [43].
2Note that the dependency of Q-values on state s is dropped, since there is only one state s.
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modelled by a d-dimensional random variable Xptq “ rX1ptq, . . . , XdptqsJ P Rd with a probability
density function (PDF) ppx, tq where x is a realisation of the random variable Xptq. Let Mnpx, tq be
the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the critical parameters in the population, i.e.,
Mnpx, tq fi 1
n
ÿ
iPN
1pxpiqptq ď xq, (1)
where the indicator function 1pxpiqptq ď xq equals 1 if xpiqj ptq ď xj for j P t1, . . . , du, or equals 0
otherwise. We define the CDF P px, tq of the random variable Xptq as the asymptotic distribution of
the empirical CDF Mnpx, tq, such that
Mnpx, tq DÑ P px, tq and ppx, tq “ dP px, tq
dx
. (2)
Therefore, as the number of agents goes to infinity, at time t, the probability density ppx, tq can be
intuitively interpreted as the proportion of agents having the particular vector x of critical parameters
in the population.
Over time, the collection of random variables Xptq forms a stochastic process tXptq; t P R`u. In
the following, we present and explain our main result in Section 3.1. We then show in Section 3.2
how we use a master equation approach—a technique of stochastic process [49]—to derive the main
result. For ease of analysis, our working assumption is nÑ8.3
3.1 Main Result: a Partial Differential Equation Describing the Population Dynamics
We consider that at time t, each independent learning agent i P N takes an action, receives an
immediate reward rpiqptq, and may have a set Iptq of additional information that is homogeneous
for every agent in the population. The information set Iptq is typically an empty set indicating that
an agent has no information other than the immediate reward it receives. However, it is possible
for independent learning agents to have access to some additional information, such as the possible
rewards of using other actions (e.g., in gradient ascent [30]), and the optimal reward in hindsight (e.g.,
in regret minimisation [9]), which do not explicitly reveal the existence of other agents. Suppose
every agent updates its critical parameters by making use of the immediate reward and the information
set. Our main result is summarised in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Consider a set N of agents, each using the same independent learning method. If there
exists a vector-valued function fθ “ rfθ,1, . . . , fθ,dsJ and a function g, such that for every agent
i P N ,
dxpiqptq
dt
“ fθpxpiqptq, rpiqptq, Iptq, tq, (3)
rpiqptq “ gpxpiqptq, tq, (4)
and fθ,j is differentiable at any x
piq
j ptq for all j P t1, . . . , du, then the population dynamics is
described by the time evolution of the probability distribution ppx, tq given as follows:
Bppx, tq
Bt “ ´
dÿ
j“1
B
Bxj rppx, tqfθ,jpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tqs. (5)
Note that the density ppx, tq is intuitively the proportion of agents having the vector x of critical
parameters in the population. Therefore, Equation 5 effectively shows how the proportion of agents
having each possible vector of critical parameters evolves as time goes forward.
Equation 3 characterises the time evolution of the critical parameters of a single agent i, in which
the function fθ represents the update rule that is repeatedly applied to the critical parameters. The
subscript θ represents the set of non-critical parameters used in the update rule, e.g., the learning rate,
discount factor, and Boltzmann exploration temperature. In contrast to the critical parameters, they
are given at the outset, unchanged over time, and are the same for every agent in the population.
3Interestingly, experiments show that the learning dynamics of a population of only 1, 000 agents can be
well described by our approach.
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The critical parameters should exhibit Markov property by the function fθ. Equation 5 requires the
partial derivative of fθ,j with respect to xj to exist for each dimension j P t1, . . . , du. The function g
stipulates that at any time t, there is exactly one reward for a particular vector of critical parameters.
The most noteworthy aspect of this theorem is that it reduces the problem of formulating the learning
dynamics of an agent population to solving a single PDE (Equation 5). This is much more tractable
compared with a system of n coupled differential equations. Moreover, Theorem 1 does not explicitly
rely on a particular learning algorithm; Equation 3, the differential equation describing the learning
dynamics of a single agent, can be instantiated for various learning methods. Therefore, building
upon the line of research that derives the differential equation for individual agents using a specific
learning method [7, 8, 10, 27, 30, 45, 56], we will be able to show, for the first time, the population
dynamics of various methods in a unified framework.
3.2 Derivation: a Master Equation Approach for Homogeneous Agent Populations
In the following, we give a brief derivation of Theorem 1; please see the appendix for more details.
As agents update their critical parameters during learning, the PDF ppx, tq evolves in time. Let us
consider the change in ppx, tq within an infinitesimal time interval pt, t` dtq. Two cases account for
the change during the time interval: (i) agents with parameters x1 change their parameters to x, and
(ii) agents with parameters x change their parameters to x1. Other cases that involve multiple steps,
such as changing from x to x1, and then back to x again, need not to be considered, as dtÑ 0. The
above contributions to the change in ppx, tq can be formulated by a master equation [51]:
Bppx, tq
Bt “
ż “
T px|x1, tqppx1, tq ´ T px1|x, tqppx, tqs dx1, (6)
where T px|x1, tq is the probability of a transition from x1 to x at time t (and likewise for T px1|x, tq).
A master equation requires the random variable to exhibit Markov property [51], so that the transition
probabilities can be written in the forms T px|x1, tq and T px1|x, tq. Equation 3 in Theorem 1 provides
this guarantee. Since independent learning methods are typically defined by MDPs, the critical
parameters generally satisfy this property.
Nevertheless, one may ask how we can ensure the time evolution of the ppx, tq is asymptotically that
of the empirical distribution. Consider the end of the time interval, t` dt. Suppose for any agent
i P N , the function T piqpx|x1, tq determines the probability of its transition from the parameters x1
to x during the time interval. We define ∆Mnpx, tq as the proportion of agents whose parameters are
within the interval px´ dx,xs at time t. That is, ∆Mnpx, tq fi Mnpx, tq ´Mnpx´ dx, tq where
Mn is the empirical CDF of Xptq. Since the critical parameters satisfy the Markov property, by the
Chapman–Kolmogorov equation [14, 34],
∆Mnpx, t` dtq “ 1
n
ÿ
iPN
ż
1pxpiqptq P px1 ´ dx,x1sqT piqpx|x1, tqdx1 “
ż
∆Mnpx1, tqT piqpx|x1, tqdx1.
(7)
Similarly, ppx, t ` dtq “ ş ppx1, tqT px|x1, tqdx1. To ensure Mnpx, t ` dtq DÑ P px, t ` dtq, the
following equation should hold:
T px|x1, tq “ T piqpx|x1, tq, @i P N . (8)
At any time t, the transition probability T piqpx|x1, tq should be the same for every agent in the
population. In essence, this requires that agents should be homogeneous, in that the transition
probability is always uniquely determined by the critical parameters, and is independent of the
identity of agents. This requirement accounts for the condition that every agent in the population
use the same learning method, in which the non-critical parameters are the same and the additional
information is homogeneous. Moreover, there should exist a function (function g in Theorem 1), such
that the immediate reward an agent receives is only determined by its critical parameters. In other
words, agents having the same critical parameters receive exactly the same immediate reward.
A master equation in its generic form provides little information without instantiating the transition
probability. Let x1 be x ` ∆x. We denote T px1|x, tq by T px,∆x, tq such that the latter is the
transition probability from x to x`∆x at time t. Similarly, denote T px|x1, tq byT px`∆x,´∆x, tq.
Then, Equation 6 can be rewritten as
Bppx, tq
Bt “
ż
rT px`∆x,´∆x, tqppx`∆x, tq ´T px,∆x, tqppx, tqs dpx`∆xq, (9)
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where dpx`∆xq can be replaced with d∆x. Using a Taylor expansion on the first term on the RHS,
Bppx, tq
Bt “
ż
rT px,´∆x, tqppx, tq `∆x ¨∇x rT px,´∆x, tqppx, tqs ´T px,∆x, tqppx, tqs d∆x.
(10)
Now, we instantiate the transition probabilities T px,∆x, tq and T px,´∆x, tq. Recall that for each
agent, the time evolution of its critical parameters is given by Equation 3. At given time t, the
probability of a transition is deterministic and can be defined with a delta function,
T px,∆x, tq fi δpfθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq ´∆xq. (11)
The transition probability T px,∆x, tq Ñ `8 if the change in x at time t (given by
fθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq) is exactly ∆x. Otherwise, the probability is 0. Similarly, T px,´∆x, tq fi
δpfθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq`∆xq. Note that
ş
T px,∆x, tqd∆x “ şT px,´∆x, tqd∆x “ 1. The first
and the third term in the integrand of Equation 10 can be cancelled out, giving
Bppx, tq
Bt “
ż
∆x ¨∇xrδpfθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq `∆xqppx, tqsd∆x. (12)
As presented in the appendix, Equation 12 will yield
Bppx, tq
Bt “ ´
dÿ
j“1
B
Bxj rppx, tqfθ,jpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tqs ,
which is Equation 5 presented in Theorem 1. We note that Equation 5 can be viewed as a special case
of the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation [18, 35, 46] with drift function fθ “ px, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq
and zero diffusion.
4 A Case Study: Cross Learning Agents
In this section, we illustrate the application of Theorem 1 by focusing on Cross learning [16], which
is arguably the origin of reinforcement learning [10], and a typical prototype for studying learning
dynamics [8]. Let us consider an infinitely large population of Cross learning agents, each of which
has two available actions A “ ta1, a2u. A Cross learning agent maintains a vector of mixed-strategy
policy piptq “ rpi1ptq, pi2ptqsJ, in which each element is the probability of using an action. At time t,
if an agent takes action aj P A and receives an immediate reward rptq, then it will update its policy
piptq, as follows:
piipt` 1q “ piiptq `
"
rptq ´ piiptq ˆ rptq if ai “ aj
´piiptq ˆ rptq else , @ai P A. (13)
Without loss of generality, we consider the probability pi1ptq of taking the first action a1 to be the
critical parameter; the degree d of freedom is 1 here, since pi1ptq ` pi2ptq “ 1. For a single agent,
the time evolution of the probability of taking an action (which is a1 here) can be described by the
following differential equation [10]:
dpi1ptq
dt
“ pi1ptq
»–rptq ´ ÿ
j:ajPA
pijptqrjptq
fifl “ pi1p1´ pi1q rr1ptq ´ r2ptqs , (14)
where rjptq is the reward at time t if action aj is used. By Theorem 1, the time evolution of the
learning dynamics in this population is then given by
Bpppi1, tq
Bt “ ´
B
Bpi1
„
pppi1, tqdpi1ptq
dt

. (15)
Identifying qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics. The main usefulness of Equation 15
is that it allows us to gain insight into the evolutionary learning dynamics in population games,
without computationally-expensive agent-based simulations. For ease of demonstration, consider
the well-known public goods (or n-player prisoner’s dilemma) game. In this game, each agent has
two actions: defect (denoted by a1) or cooperate (denoted by a2q. Let ψ be the current proportion of
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(a) pi1 „ Np0.5, 0.12q (b) pi1 „ Betap0.4, 0.4q (c) pi1 „ Np0.8, 0.32q (d) pi1 „ Np0.2, 0.32q
Figure 1: The evolution of the pppi1, tq in public goods games with different initial distributions.
cooperating agents at time t. An agent will receive a reward r1ptq “ 1.5ψ if it defects, or a reward
r2ptq “ 1.5ψ ´ 0.5 if it cooperates. Suppose at time t “ 0, the probability pi1 of taking action a1
(defection) for each agent is distributed according to the truncated normal distribution Np0.5, 0.12q.
By solving Equation 15 with such initial distribution,4 one can obtain how pppi1, tq evolves over time
(shown in Figure 1(a)). It is unsurprising that as time proceeds, the population converges to defect
with high probability, because defection always results in a higher reward than cooperation. However,
as shown in Figures 1(a)-1(d), with different initial distributions, the time evolution of pppi1, tq can
be qualitatively different. Such information is usually elusive in agent-based simulations, given the
randomness arising from each simulation run. In contrast, our approach immediately discloses this
information, simply by solving Equation 15.
Understanding the trend of expected behaviours. Another application of Equation 15 is to
investigate the expected behaviours of agents in the population. Let Erpi1ptqs be the expected
probability of taking action a1 in the population at time t. It can be shown that
dErpi1ptqs
dt
“ d
dt
ż 1
0
pi1pppi1, tqdpi1 “ rr2ptq ´ r1ptqs
ż 1
0
pi1ppi1 ´ 1qpppi1, tqdpi1. (16)
The integral on the RHS is smaller than 0. Hence, at time t, the value of dErpi1ptqsdt will be positive if
r2ptq ă r1ptq, or be negative if r2ptq ą r1ptq. This indicates that the expected probability Erpi1ptqs of
taking action a1 changes in the direction of a higher immediate reward. Moreover, if the distribution
pppi1, tq is more concentrated around pi1 “ 0.5, the magnitude of the integral on the RHS will increase.
That is, with a larger proportion of agents not showing an explicit tendency to choose a particular
action, the expected change in their probability of taking each action becomes more intense.
Steady state analysis. Though it is not our intention to analyse the convergence to Nash equilibria,
Equation 15 also allows us to study steady states. Consider Bpppi1,tqBt “ 0, such that there is no change
in pppi1, tq of each realisation pi1, and thus the distribution is completely steady. Then,
rr1ptq ´ r2ptqsBpppi1, tqBpi1 “ ´rr1ptq ´ r2ptqs
1´ 2pi1
p1´ pi1qpi1 pppi1, tq. (17)
Solving this equation with the property
ş1
0
pppi1, tqdpi1 “ 1, we have p˚ppi1, tq “ cpi1p1´pi1q with
cÑ 0`. In this steady distribution, we have p˚ppi1, tq Ñ `8 when pi1 P t0, 1u, and p˚ppi1, tq Ñ 0
when pi1 P p0, 1q. This indicates that half of the agents in the population have pi1 “ 0, while the
other half have pi1 “ 1, regardless of their immediate rewards. This is confirmed by Equation 13—a
Cross learning agent’s policy remains unchanged once pi1 reaches 0 or 1. Therefore, in fact, there
are countless possible steady states, in which each agent takes either pi1 “ 0 or pi1 “ 1, yet which
particular value an agent takes does not matter. Once the population evolves into one of these states
or takes one of these states as the initial distribution, the population will remain in that state forever.
5 Validation on Various Learning Methods and Population Games
In this section, we focus on validating our approach across different learners and population games.
We selected three different learning methods, i.e., Cross learning [16], Q-learning [58] with Boltz-
mann exploration, and Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent (IGA) [52]. In contrast to Cross learning and
4In this paper, we use finite difference to solve the PDEs.
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(a) Public goods game. (b) Mac vs. Windows game
(critical mass for Mac initially
reached).
(c) Mac vs. Windows game
(critical mass for Mac initially not
reached).
(d) El Farol bar game.
(e) El Farol bar game with time-varying threshold of crowdedness.
Figure 2: The population dynamics derived by our approach versus that observed in agent-based
simulations. The lines with markers indicate the expected probability of taking an action given by our
approach. The shaded lines indicate the average probability of taking that action, which is averaged
over 100 simulations where each population comprised 1, 000 agents.
Q-learning, IGA assumes that agents know the expected reward function (Iptq is non-empty).5 For
comparison, we considered five configurations for three typical population games: the public goods,
Mac vs. Windows, and El Farol bar games. The Mac vs. Windows game [23] models the network
effect phenomena (the value of a product increases as the number of users increases) commonly
observed in economics, while the El Farol bar game [13] models the congestion effect. We compared
the expected probability of taking an action derived by our approach with the average probability
of taking that action observed in the agent-based simulations. Due to space constraints, the precise
game configuration details, simulation setup, and instantiation of Theorem 1 for Q-learning and IGA,
are provided in the appendix.
Results and Analysis. As Figure 2 shows, our approach well describes the different patterns of
evolution arising in the different scenarios. These results validate Theorem 1 holds for these learning
methods and population games. In the following, we report several salient findings. More fleshed out
descriptions can be found in the appendix.
In the public goods game, we observed that for a population of Q-learning agents, the expected
probability of defection eventually stabilises around 0.7 (Figure 2(a)). This indicates a population of
Q-learners may not fully evolve to defect despite it being the unique Nash equilibrium state.
In the Mac vs. Windows game, Figure 2(b) shows that every agent will become a Mac user, if a
critical mass for the prevalence of Mac is initially reached. Symmetrically, Figure 2(c) shows that for
Cross learning and IGA, every agent will become a Windows user, if the initial proportion of Mac
users is slightly less than the critical mass. However, this does not hold for Q-learning, suggesting
that a population of Q-learning agents is less sensitive to initial conditions.
Finally, in the El Farol bar game (Figure 2(d)), our approach shows that the expected probability
of going to the bar eventually stabilises around 60% (the threshold of crowdedness). Figure 2(e)
illustrates a more complex scenario where the threshold of crowdedness was decreased from 60% to
20% at time t “ 40, and then increased again to 50% at time t “ 80. Even under this more difficult
setting, our approach well-describes the population dynamics for each learning method.
5IGA was originally designed for two-player-two-action games. We extend IGA by assuming that the
expected reward of taking each action is known to agents. Details are provided in the appendix.
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Broader Impact
The past few years have witnessed the dramatic growth of the RL literature, and also in the sophisti-
cation of RL methods. While it is common to treat RL as a black-box tool, there is a need to develop
a better understanding of these algorithms. Consider social robots that assist the blind, unmanned
vehicles that avoid pedestrians, and autonomous agents that trade in financial markets; understanding
how policies and decisions are shaped by RL methods in these scenarios is crucial. Put another way,
can we trust these methods? This issue will become unavoidably more salient as intelligent agents
become more ubiquitous in the future.
Our work—providing a unified framework for formulating the evolutionary dynamics of independent
RL methods in population games—makes one step towards addressing this issue. Specifically, we
illustrate through a case study that instantiating Theorem 1 for a particular learning method helps us
identify qualitatively different patterns of evolution, perform steady state analysis, and understand
the trend of expected behaviours in a population. Theorem 1 may have broader application, such as
selecting an algorithm for a specific problem, parameter tuning, and shedding light on the design of a
new algorithm, which have been identified as the potential benefits of understanding RL dynamics [8].
On the flip side, the misuse of our approach may cause a negative impact. Directly applying the
PDE (Equation 5) to other scenarios that violate one of the assumptions stipulated in Theorem 1
may result in misleading and error prone conclusions for stakeholders. We thus caution the use
of our approach for heterogeneous or structured agent populations, and for joint-action learning
methods (e.g., Nash-Q [26], minimax-Q [40] and Friend-or-Foe Q [41]). A promising direction for
future research is to study evolutionary learning dynamics when the aforementioned scenarios are
considered.
Appendix A. Details about the Derivation
In the following, more details about the derivation are presented. In Appendix A.1, we show how we
reach the main result (Equation 5 in Theorem 1) from Equation 12 of the main text. In Appendix
A.2, we provide detailed explanations about how we instantiate the probabilities T px,∆x, tq and
T px,´∆x, tq, which are used in the master equation. In Appendix A.3, we discuss the implication
of Equation 8 of the main text in detail.
A.1 Derivation from Equation 12 to Equation 5
In the main text, we mention that Equation 5 in Theorem 1 can be derived from Equation 12. In the
following, we show the intermediate steps.
Bppx, tq
Bt “
ż
∆x ¨∇xrδpfθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq `∆xqppx, tqsd∆x. (18)
“
ż dÿ
j“1
∆xj
Brδpfθpxptq, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq `∆xqppx, tqs
Bxj d∆x (19)
“
dÿ
j“1
B
Bxj
ż
∆xjδpfθpxptq, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq `∆xqppx, tqd∆x (20)
“
dÿ
j“1
B
Bxj rppx, tq
ż
∆xjδpfθpxptq, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq `∆xqd∆xs (21)
“ ´
dÿ
j“1
B
Bxj rppx, tqfθ,jpxptq, gpx, tq, Iptq, tqs. (22)
From the above Equation 21 to 22, when ∆x “ ´fθpxptq, rptq, Iptq, tq in which ∆xj “
´fθ,jpxptq, rptq, Iptq, tq, the delta function δpfθpxptq, rptq, Iptq, tq ` ∆xq Ñ `8. Otherwise,
the delta function equals 0. Therefore, the integral in Equation 21 equals ´fθ,jpxptq, rptq, Iptq, tq.
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A.2 Instantiation of Probabilities T px,∆x, tq and T px,´∆x, tq
For a single agent i, at given time t, its change in its critical parameters is given by the function fθ
(Equation 3 in Theorem 1). Because every agent in the population adopts the same function fθ, at
given time t, the change in a particular vector x of critical parameters does not vary for different
agents, and is uniquely given by fθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq. Thus, we can characterise the probability
T px,∆x, tq of a transition from x to x`∆x by a delta function
T px,∆x, tq fi δpfθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq ´∆xq. (23)
The probabilityT px,∆x, tq is non-zero if and only if the change in the vector x of critical parameters,
given by fθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq, is exactly ∆x. Similarly, the probabilityT px,´∆x, tq of a transition
from x to x´∆x can be defined by a delta function
T px,´∆x, tq fi δpfθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq `∆xq. (24)
The probability T px,´∆x, tq is non-zero if and only if the change in the vector x of critical
parameters, given by fθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq, is exactly ´∆x.
Note that the integral of a delta function is 1. Hence, we haveż
T px,∆x, tqd∆x “
ż
δpfθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq ´∆xqd∆x “ 1. (25)
and ż
T px,´∆x, tqd∆x “
ż
δpfθpx, gpx, tq, Iptq, tq `∆xqd∆x “ 1. (26)
A.3 Homogeneity required by Equation 8
In the main text, we show that to ensure the time evolution of the ppx, tq is asymptotically that of the
empirical distribution, the following equation should hold:
T px|x1, tq “ T piqpx|x1, tq, @i P N . (27)
This equation requires that at given time t, the probability of a transition for any agent should be
uniquely determined by the critical parameters from which and to which the agent transits, and
be independent of their identity. In other words, agents should be homogeneous, in that they are
distinguished only by their critical parameters. Note that for a single agent i, its change in the
critical parameters is given by the parameterised function fθ (Equation 3 in Theorem 1). Hence, as
stipulated in Theorem 1, there should exist the same function fθ for every agent the population, in
which the non-critical parameters θ should be also the same. Moreover, the function fθ depends
on the critical parameters, and also on the immediate reward and the additional information set. To
ensure the homogeneity, there should exist a function (function g in Theorem 1) that maps a vector
of critical parameters to an immediate reward, such that at given time t, agents having the same
critical parameters receive the same immediate reward. In addition, agents having the same critical
parameters should make use of the same additional information.
Appendix B. Instantiations of Theorem 1
In the following, we briefly describeQ-learning with Boltzmann exploration and infinitesimal gradient
ascent, and show how Theorem 1 can be instantiated with these two learning methods.
B.1 Q-learning with Boltzmann exploration
Description of the method. In a single-state (or stateless) MDP with a set A of k available actions,
a Q-learning agent [58] maintains a vector of Q-values Qptq “ rQ1ptq, . . . , QkptqsJ, each of which
Qiptq estimates the expected reward of using an action ai P A at time t. Suppose that at time t, an
agent takes action aj and receives an immediate reward rptq accordingly. This agent will update the
Q-value for each action ai as follows:
Qipt` 1q “
"p1´ αqQiptq ` αrptq if ai “ aj
Qiptq else , @ai P A, (28)
10
where α is the learning rate. Note that the term estimating the optimal reward after state transition is
dropped, since agents stay in the same state [27, 32, 47, 60].
The agent then updates its policy based on the updated Q-values. Let pipt` 1q be its mixed-strategy
policy at time t`1, such that pipt`1q “ rpi1pt`1q, . . . , pikpt`1qsJ in which each element piipt`1q
is the probability of taking action ai at time t` 1. A Q-learning agent using Boltzmann exploration
will update the policy as follows:
piipt` 1q “ e
τQipt`1qř
j:ajPA e
τQjpt`1q , @ai P A, (29)
where τ is the Boltzmann exploration temperature. A larger value of τ indicates the fewer exploration
for individual agents. When τ Ñ8, agents take the action with the highest Q-value in probability 1.
Instantiation. We consider an agent’s Q-values Qptq P Rk to be its critical parameters. It is shown
[27] that the differential equation that describes the time evolution of an agent’s Q-values in stateless
MDP is given by
dQiptq
dt
“ α e
τQiptqř
j:ajPA e
τQjptq rrptq ´Qiptqs, @ai P A. (30)
By Theorem 1, we have the following partial differential equation:
BppQ, tq
Bt “ ´
ÿ
i:aiPA
B
BQi
„
ppQ, tqdQiptq
dt

, (31)
where ppQ, tq is intuitively interpreted as the proportion of agents having the particular vector
Q “ rQ1, . . . , QksJ of Q-values in the population at time t.
B.2 Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent
Description of the method. Infinitesimal Gradient Ascent [52] (IGA) was originally designed for
two-player-two-action games. Consider a set A of 2 available actions. An IGA agent maintains a
vector of policy piptq “ rpi1ptq, pi2ptqsJ, in which each element piiptq is the probability of using an
action ai P A. At time t, if the agent takes action aj and receives an immediate reward rptq, then it
will update its policy piptq, as follows:
piipt` 1q “ piiptq ` αBV ppi, tqBpii , @ai P A, (32)
where α is the step size (or learning rate), and V ppi, tq denotes the value function that maps a policy
pi to its expected reward at time t. IGA assumes agents have access to the value function. We extend
this method by assuming that the reward of taking each action is known to agents, such that the value
function V ppi, tq is defined as
V ppi, tq “
ÿ
i:aiPA
pii ˆ riptq, (33)
where riptq is the reward of taking action ai at time t. Therefore, an IGA agent will update its policy
by taking steps in the direction of the gradient of its expected reward.
Instantiation. For two-action games, we consider an IGA agent’s critical parameter to be its
probability pi1ptq of taking action a1. It is shown [30] that the differential equation that describes the
change in the probability of taking an action (which is action a1 here) is given by
dpi1ptq
dt
“ αBV ppi, tqBpii . (34)
By Theorem 1, we have the following partial differential equation:
Bpppi1, tq
Bt “ ´
B
Bpi1
„
pppi1, tqdpi1ptq
dt

, (35)
where pppi1, tq is intuitively interpreted as the proportion of agents having the particular probability
pi1 of taking action a1 in the population at time t.
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Appendix C. Details about the Experiments
In the following, we present the experimental settings, precise game configurations, and the detailed
results across different learning methods and population games.
C.1 Experimental Settings
For validation, we compare the expected probability of taking an action derived by our approach with
the average probability of taking that action observed in agent-based simulations. For the learning rate
(or step size) α in Q-learning and IGA, we set it to be 0.05. For Boltzmann exploration temperature
τ in Q-learning, we set it to be 2. We note that Cross learning requires the rewards to range in r0, 1s.
To get rid of this requirement, we impose a small update step with the size α “ 0.01 (by multiplying
the update term by α “ 0.01), following the common practice [8].
Unless stated otherwise, for Cross learning and IGA, we assume the initial probability of taking the
first action for each agent is distributed according to the truncated normal distribution Np0.5, 0.12q.
For Q-learning, we assume the initial Q-values for the two actions are both distributed according to a
truncated normal distribution Npprmax ` rminq{2, 0.42q, in which rmax and rmin denote the maximal
and the minimal rewards of a population game, respectively. As a result, agent populations use
different learning methods though, initially, the expected probability (or the average probability in
simulations) of taking the first action is all around 0.5. In other words, agents generally choose their
actions randomly in the beginning.
In the agent-based simulations, we consider a population of 1, 000 agents. To smooth out randomness,
we run 100 simulations for each setting.
C.2 Game Configurations and Detailed Results
Public Goods Game. As we mentioned in Section 4 of the main text, in this game, each agent has
two actions: defect (denoted by a1) or cooperate (denoted by a2q. An agent will receive a reward
r1ptq “ 1.5ψ if it defects , and a reward r2ptq “ 1.5ψ´ 0.5 if it cooperates, in which ψ is the current
proportion of cooperating agents. Because defection always yields a higher reward than cooperation,
the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is that every agents converge to defect.
Not surprisingly, our approach shows in Figure 2(a) of the main text that all of the agent populations
develop a tendency to take defection. However, our approach also indicates that to what degree agents
develop such tendency vary greatly for the use of different methods. In fact, for a population of
Q-learning agents, the expected probability of taking defection eventually stabilises around 0.7. This
suggests that a population of Q-learning agents may not evolve into the full convergence to defect
despite it being the unique Nash equilibrium state.
Mac vs. Windows Game. This game [23] models the network effect phenomena commonly
observed in economics. When a network effect is present, the value of a product or service increases
as the number of users increases. For example, as there are more Windows users, people can share
files with a larger community, and companies are more attracted to developing software for Windows
users. This will in turn create a positive reinforcement, resulting in an even larger userbase.
In this game, there are two actions, namely, use Mac (denoted by a1) and use Windows (denoted
by a2). Let ψ be the proportion of Mac users at time t. The immediate reward function is given as:
r1ptq “ 0.5`1.5ψ and r2ptq “ 1.5p1´ψq. By this reward function, Mac is inherently more superior,
however, using Windows will receive a higher reward if less than 13 of agents in the population use
Mac. In other words, 13 of Mac users is the critical mass for the prevalence of Mac. As shown in
Figure 2(b) of the main text, our approach shows that every agent will become a Mac user, if initially
around half of the agents in the population are Mac users.
We then consider another initial situation, such that there are around 28% of Mac users (slightly
less than the critical mass) in an agent population for each learning method. Specifically, for Cross
learning and IGA, we assume the initial probability of taking the first action (using Mac) for each
agent is distributed according to the truncated normal distribution Np0.28, 0.12q. For Q-learning,
we assume the initial Q-values for the first and the second actions are distributed according to the
truncated normal distributions Np0, 0.12q and Np0.5, 0.12q, respectively. It is shown in Figure 2(c)
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that for cross learning and IGA, every agent becomes a Windows user. However, forQ-learning, every
agent becomes a Mac user. This suggests that compared with cross learning and IGA, a population of
Q-learning agents is less sensitive to the initial conditions, which is critical in population games with
a network effect.
El Farol Bar game. This game [3] is an extensively-studied model [59] for the congestion effect
phenomena widely exist in economics and daily life. In this game, there are two actions: go to the
El Farol Bar (denoted by a1), and stay home (denoted by a2). Agents staying home always receive
no reward, i.e., r2ptq “ 0. For agents going to the bar, an agent will receive a reward r1ptq “ 1
if currently less than 60% of the agents in a population go to the bar. However, it will receive a
punishment r1ptq “ ´1 otherwise, because the bar is too crowded. As shown in Figure 2(d) of the
main text, our approach shows that the expected probability of going to bar eventually stabalises
around 60%.
To further validate our approach, we deliberately make the game more complex, so that the population
dynamics become more unpredictable. We decrease the threshold of crowdedness from 60% to 20%
at time t “ 40, and then increase it again to 50% at time t “ 80. It is shown in Figure 2(e) that under
this more difficult setting, our approach still well describes the population dynamics for each learning
method. Moreover, our approach also shows that IGA agents change their probability of going to
bar more timely due to the change in the threshold of crowdedness. This suggests that IGA is more
responsive than Q-learning and cross learning in population games with a congestion effect.
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